The Intrinsic and Extrinsic Existence of

What is Traveled in Traveling[1]

 

Lester Embree

Florida Atlantic University

 

ABSTRACT: Believings, valuings, and willings can be distinguished. Ends and means correlate with willings just as things with intrinsic and extrinsic values correlate with valuings. Using the case of what is traveled in traveling, i.e., a route, as a running example, this essay attempts to show the analogous correlates for believings.

 

Introduction

1. It is somewhat unfortunate that Husserl believed he was founding a new primal science—i.e., a first philosophy in which all other sciences could be grounded—and hence named his effort with a word ending in “-ology.” This is unfortunate because we who follow him and call ourselves phenomenologists are regularly asked what “phenomenology” signifies by people also sometimes have difficulty pronouncing the word.  One might respond to this recurring question by asserting that phenomenology is the approach of “reflective analysis.” If the questioner wants more, one might try making just two points.

2. The first is that while most scientific work is highly argumentative and often seeks to produce a deductive system, phenomenology more properly deserves the title “analysis” because it chiefly produces sequences of distinctions more or less well clarified with examples. This is not to say that phenomenologists never offer arguments, especially when opposing other positions, or that phenomenological results cannot be arranged into deductive systems. But it is to say that argumentation and deductive systematization are not the central concerns for phenomenology that they are for other approaches.

3. The second point concerns the way in which phenomenology is “reflective.” Perhaps the curious will be satisfied if one tells them that phenomenologists analyze and describe the encounterings of things and correlatively things-as-encountered, following this with some examples of encountering-encountered correlations, such as that between valuing and things-as-valued, including loving and persons-as-loved. Since informal discussions tend to be brief, the questioning may well stop there, and one can then avoid having to explain how phenomenology can be either transcendental or worldly; how phenomenological philosophy includes epistemology, axiology, and ethics; and how the generic approach is also specified in disciplines beyond philosophy, such as sociology and psychiatry.

4. The running example in the present investigation will be what is traveled in traveling, which appears best called a route. A route can be selected on one or more roads, superhighways, streets, railroads, or footpaths, and it can also be a way through a building, e.g., down the hall, up the stairs, around the corner to the left, etc. There are also routes across oceans and through the air, as well as combinations of ways via air, land, and water. Land routes will be focused on here. Routes are originally encountered not in contemplating them theoretically but in traveling them practically. If reflective analysis of routes and the traveling of them occurs, it comes only secondarily. Prior to such analysis, we can say that we see a route and signify that we recognize one as an already constituted cultural object, i.e., a thing encountered with value and use.

5. The present analysis begins with the correlation of concrete encountering and routes-as-encountered and proceeds to analyze the abstractly discernable components within encountering of willing, valuing, and experiencing and correlatively, routes-as-willed, routes-as-valued, and routes–as-experienced as abstract components within the route-as-encountered. Finally, the analysis will turn to believing and routes-as-believed-in and the objectivation of belief characteristics. Most of what is stated here is novel only with respect to terminology and emphasis, but the recognition of intrinsic and extrinsic existence of things like routes is a small discovery, at least for the present writer.

 

Encountering and Routes-as-Encountered

6. A route is originally encountered in traveling it, and as such, it is something that is also experienced, believed in, and valued, but it is predominantly “volitional.” It will be important to bear in mind throughout this essay that “volitional” and parallel words are, unless otherwise indicated, employed in broad significations that include what is learned, habitual or traditional—i.e., forms of what Husserl calls secondary passivity—rather than referring solely to egoic willing. Even if one gets to places by automatically following others who seem to know the way, this routine action is predominantly volitional. It is true that an ego (or better, an I) may occasionally engage in willing a trip in a narrow signification, i.e., perform volitional operations, particularly when a route is being chosen, when it is taken for the first time, or when an unexpected problem arises during the execution of a decision. But what usually happens is a more or less skilled movement along the route, whether on foot, on horseback, or as driver or passenger of another vehicle. In other words, speeding up, slowing down, turning, continuing straight, pausing, etc. tend to happen in rather automatic ways when someone skilled at traveling a familiar route is on her way.

7. As volitionally encountered, the route is a means to a goal, purpose, or end, which is to say the destination at the end of the route. In traditional Husserlian terminology, things-as-encountered are called “noemata” and include thetic qualities or, better, positional characteristics. Husserl’s emphasis is on doxothetic characteristics, but this is not the only species. There are also practical positings and what can be called functions or, better, uses that can be discerned and described through reflectively observing and analyzing things-as-encountered. For example, if, while en route, one decides to go elsewhere, the initial destination recognizably loses its actual use for us as a goal while at the same time the new place acquires it. We might think that the abandoned route then becomes merely a strip of space, but closer reflection discloses that it is still a road, albeit one no longer taken. If the road is washed out, however, then it is not properly a road until repaired, because it cannot become part of a route from here to there. Nevertheless, a thing that is spoiled is still a practical thing in the broad signification.

8. The abstractly discernable willing components in a concrete road-encountering are, along with the correlative use characteristics in the things volitionally encountered, reflectively discernable components of larger wholes. When one is taking one road in order to reach another road, the latter road is the immediate end, but it is also simultaneously a means to reach the final destination of the trip, which is the ultimate end of the traveling. Just as a stretch of road within a route can be both an end and a means, an encountered thing can have an intrinsic value and an extrinsic value at the same time. For example, setting a broken arm without anesthesia will hurt greatly and be intrinsically valued negatively, but at the same time the bone setting has an extrinsic positive value in relation to the intrinsic positive value of the healed and pain-free arm expected in a few weeks.

9. One can also find components of valuation in the background of the willing that predominates in volitional encounterings and their intentive correlates in the things-as-encountered. The preferring of one way over others that are believed possible is not a volitional but a valuational component and is also in the background of the willing component. There are other parallels between willing and valuing, all in broad significations.  Thus, noematic positional characteristics of all three sorts can be positive, negative, or neutral in modality. One can disvalue a possible route and will-against as well as will-for a route believed possible. This analysis can be expanded by considering the other modes, but it will suffice here to focus on positive willing and valuing and, later, positive believing.

10. Another parallel between volition and valuation concerns the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction. This distinction holds for all kinds of positings. Thus things can be willed for their own sakes, and then called ends, and things can be willed for the sake of other things, and then called means. Analogously, things can be valued for their own sakes or valued for the sakes of other things and one can then speak of intrinsic and extrinsic values. One can readily find expressions parallel to intrinsic and extrinsic values by choosing a suitable noun for the adjectives to modify. Use seems appropriate in this connection. Thus ends have intrinsic uses and means have extrinsic uses.

 

Belief and Objectivation

11. The foregoing does not go beyond what Husserl writes in Ideen I except terminologically and with respect to emphasis.[2] His publications do have an naturalistic tendency that can be overcome through appreciating not only that encountering and the correlative things-as-encountered include willings and uses as well as valuings and values. These are crucial for practical life, which is the original form of life. Nevertheless, believing and also experiencing cannot be omitted from the analysis. It is unfortunately all too easy for modern intellectuals to adopt a naturalistic attitude and thus abstract from the volitional and valuational components within encounters. Under such an abstraction, what remains is the experienced core of the thing encountered and how it is believed in.

12. In the case of a route, the core abstracted from the concrete thing-as-originally-encountered might be called a strip of space extending from one spot to another with segments and other spots distinguishable within it. In the naturalistic attitude such spots are not places, much less starting places, stopping places along the route, or the final stopping place or destination. It seems best to speak of the experienced cores of what is encountered as strips and spots rather than lines and points because lines and points tend to designate ideal rather than real things. The strips alluded to here tend to be more or less indeterminate, so that, for example, one can wait until one reaches where a turn is needed and then find how to make it. It would also be an error to believe that a route needs to be demarcated in space, as occurs with pavement and highways or with a path worn through the woods by the feet of humans or other animals. If it occurs to a traveler to take a shortcut across an open field, the segment of the strip that is then traveled is not marked out in advance at all. It is belief in the way to traverse it that makes it a route.

13. A strip of space can be experienced in several ways. Perceiving is the original form of the direct experiencing of real things, i.e., temporal things, including spatiotemporal things sensuously perceived. The reality perceived occurs at the same time as the perceiving of it, and reflection on the thing-as-perceived can readily disclose that the perceived thing’s manner of givenness is perceptual. Then again, a reality can be remembered, in which case the reality remembered is distinctly earlier than the remembering of it; here reflection can disclose within what is remembered not only the thing-as-previously-perceived, but also the earlier perceiving of it, as well as the memorial manner of givenness in the perception-as-remembered. Finally, there can be expecting, and in its future, the thing expected, the thing-as-expected, and the expected future perceiving of the thing, all of which can once again be reflectively distinguished and described.

14. While the things perceived and remembered can be more or less clear, expected things are always obscure when the expecting is serious. But expecting can also be fictive, in which case one can imagine, or better, feign the thing expected as if it was perceived or as if it was remembered or expected and then it has a quasi-clarity. And of course, one can also fictively perceive and remember; indeed, one can even fictively believe, value, and will. Fictive expecting plays a rather important role in deliberation.

15. In the perceptually encountered route, there is a segment of the strip of space that can be said to be presented. This is the segment in view in predominantly visual perceiving. (There can be predominantly auditory or tactual presenting as well, but vision will be focused on here.) One might then contend that the segments out of sight ahead of and behind the traveler are expected and remembered. But expectings and rememberings are distinct mental operations with I-engagement, and this does not typically take place as we travel along. Instead, it needs to be recognized that the other segments are appresented along with the segment presented and that the whole strip, much of it rather obscure, is what is perceived.

16. A great deal can be said about believing and things-as-believed-in, but merely a few remarks will suffice. Belief includes “believing-in,” which is prepredicative, and “believing-about,” which includes the believing of propositions and is then predicative. A spot on the strip can be believed in just as the strip can be. The original belief characteristic discernable in noematic reflection is actuality. But there are other modalities, including possibility, which is important in deliberation, where one is foolish to consider choosing something that is believed impossible. It is not unusual for the characteristic of being believed in of a thing perceived or remembered not to be recognized. For example, if a segment of the strip of space is presentively seen to be straight or curved in some way, its being straight or curved is simply believed in. But with analytic effort the manner of givenness and doxothetic characteristic can be distinguished.

17. Belief characteristics can be objectivated and predicated. Thus the noematic doxothetic characteristic of possibility of the apperceived straight or curved continuation of the strip of space can be focused on, distinctly believed in, and attributed to the strip. It can then be said, perhaps, that “curves ahead are possible.” Then possibility, which is a mode of existence, is predicated. More often predication takes forms like “the strip is curved,” but modes of existence are sometimes predicated. When they are, what were described as the thetic characteristics of things-as-believed-in, i.e., belief characteristics, are renamed using such ontological terms as actuality, possibility, probability, etc., or one might simply say that “the strip of space exists.” This operation on things-as-believed-in, including the renaming, is called objectivation.

 

The Existence of Routes and Destinations

18. With these preparations, a question pertaining to the belief stratum in the encountering and thing-as-encountered in the case of a route can now be addressed. Recognizing that believings and belief characteristics, objectivated or not, are abstractly discernable components in concrete encounters, the focus can shift back and forth between the abstract naturalistic and the concrete personalistic or, better, cultural attitudes.

19. A route has a start, and may include junctions where one changes roads, and stopping places. But, above all, a route has a destination. It is, of course, possible merely to wander around, as we say “purposelessly,” but this is not traveling. Wandering does have a starting place, but having a starting place is not definitive for traveling. If one is traveling for enjoyment—e.g., just going for a walk or taking a ride to enjoy the day—but deliberately ends up back home when finished, there is a destination, and it is indeed a case of traveling. Having a destination is definitive for a route; a route leads somewhere. When one gets lost, there is still a destination but the route needs to be found again. Similarly, when one is searching for a place, there is a destination but the route has yet to be constituted.

20. Abstracting again from willing and the characteristic of being willed, i.e., the use, and also valuing and the correlative value, the abstractly discernable strip of space that remains has two extreme spots. When something moving along the strip is considered, it is possible to recognize not only the direction of movement, but also the spot from which and the spot toward which there is movement. (As just contended, however, the former can be disregarded here because, although wandering has a starting place, only cases of traveling have a willed ending place or destination.) The connection of the strip and the spot toward which there is movement is crucial for traveling. On the level of experiencing, e.g., perceiving, the relation between the strip and the extreme spot toward which there is movement can be called “conduciveness.” The strip leads to or is conducive to that extreme spot.

21. The selection of expressions is often difficult. Some believe that leading to, conducive, and conduciveness are strictly practical. But it can also be contended that, e.g., a strip along which there is something moving and the extreme spot moved toward are such that the former leads to the latter and hence there is conduciveness in what is experienced and volitional or praxothetic characteristics that make a route practical is simply founded on that. The words end and means are similarly used for the things with their praxothetic characteristics and for the cores that are foundational.

22. When the naturalistic abstraction is relaxed, the route-as-traveled is predominantly such that the route is a means and the destination is an end. This is a matter of volition. Choosing a route will typically be founded upon a valuational preferring of one way to the destination over possible others. On these levels, the destination has not only intrinsic use, but also intrinsic value, while the route is not only willed for the sake of the destination, but has extrinsic value as well as extrinsic use.

            23. Is there not a parallel contrast of the intrinsic and extrinsic for belief? If there is, then the belief characteristic of a thing believed-in as conduced to, e.g., the extreme spot moved toward, is intrinsic, and the belief characteristic of the route believed in as conducive to it, e.g., the strip of space, is extrinsic. In other words, if conduciveness is believed in, there are two things, the one believed in for its own sake and another believed in for the sake of the other.

            24. With objectivation, the destination is a place that can be traveled to and it is at least implied that there is a route to it. Encounterings and things-as-encountered have four discernable strata in them, three thetic or positional strata, i.e., willing, valuing, and believing (in broad significations), and experiencing. Conduciveness is willed, valued, and believed as well as experienced. If one wants to understand, much less justify the positings, one needs to distinguish and describe these strata. Search for the relations of foundation and motivation on the basis of experiencing can then begin. In the stratum of belief, there are belief characteristics in the thing-as-believed-in that can be objectivated. When they are believed in as in connections of things conducing and conduced to, things in conduciveness connections have intrinsic and extrinsic existence analogously to how things can have intrinsic and extrinsic values and uses. 

 

Concluding Remark

            25. The above analysis does not hold merely for routes and destinations. It is easily extended to causes and effects, so that effects have intrinsic existence and causes have extrinsic existence. One can believe in fire and one can believe in boiling water, but there is a difference when one believes in a connection of fire leading to boiling water. Then again, perhaps a case can be made in phenomenological theory of logic for premises in arguments having extrinsic and the conclusions they lead to having intrinsic existence. The example of travel is good, however, because it shows that the existential statuses of the conduced to and the conducing also occur in real connections other than causal ones.  //END//