Zôon Logon Ekhon*
Lester Embree
Introduction
Many today would interpret Aristotle to have
defined the human as the animal that has speech. Aron Gurwitsch tended toward
the more traditional interpretation, that of the human as the rational animal.[1]
Rationality for him involved the capacity for what Kurt Goldstein called the
"abstract attitude" and, beyond that, theoria.[2]
Where speech in relation to humanity is concerned, however, the following
passage from an all but forgotten critical study expresses a fundamental view
that Gurwitsch never abandoned.
Like everything of the human and cultural [spiritual]
order, language attracts scientific interest and does so from numerous
standpoints. Forming one of the distinctive and, perhaps (as many
believe), the most important and the most essential characteristics of the
humanity of the human, language at the same time serves humans as an
instrument. It presents itself as a fact in the mental evolution of the
individual that on the one hand results in the progressive acquisition of
language and on the other hand undergoes the influences of this process to such
an extent that the psychology of the adult individual is fundamentally
determined by the fact that he has language at his disposal and is palpably
modified by alterations in this aptitude. At the same time, language is one of
the most prominent facts of social life; it is what makes the constitution of a
society possible but, on the other hand, through a dialectic analogous to that
just pointed out in the psychology of the individual, it contains traces of
the structure of this society.
…………….
The general or, if one prefers, philosophical problem of language
is to know whether or not language can be considered
as a totally and exclusively natural datum. This would be to say that it is
perfectly explained by the facts of human anatomy and physiology, by such and
such psychological tendencies innate in human nature (e.g., the tendency to
imitate, which so many psychologists have given a privileged place), and also
by the conditions of communal life, by the fact that the human being always and
forever finds himself placed in the midst of society. Such and such facts, such
tendencies, such general conditions of human life being given, language would
arise in a quasi-automatic fashion and without anything like a mental effort or
a spiritual inititive, as one will, needing to intervene. It would come forward
as a power, as a reality that imposes itself on the human, not only on this or
that individual but on the human tout court, on the individual qua
human. Hence we take the term "nature" in a very broad sense, for it
hardly matters essentially whether the reality in question is imposed on the
individual from without, e.g., by a social constraint, or whether it emanates
from human nature as it is actualized in each individual. In either case, it
would not be his work and creation. If, on the contrary, one considers
language as a creation issuing from something like the inititive, the free
effort of the human and if one finds traces of this origin even in his most
evolved state, then one would be led to think that language evidences the
presence of something in human nature that goes beyond the purely natural
plane, however one would characterize this "non-natural" element in a
positive way. And, by reason of the importance of the fact of language one can
make this "non-natural" factor the core of the humanity of the human
to the point of definitively opening the gap that separates the human being
from the purely natural beings. One can then play on an equivocation and say
that the nature of the hum-in (his humanity) consists in not being (in the
sense given above) a natural being. Even where the human seems to act like a
brute [a l’air de se comporter en être animal], he would not be one
truly; even then his actions and reactions are within the framework of the
humanity of the human and are marked by it.[3]
The present essay develops an approach to the
human that evades the question of the humanity of the human and instead uses
some other Gurwitschean opinions as starting point for the development of an
explanation of the human in which speech holds a central place as explanans
rather than as explanandum. By the above passage this seems to have been a possibility Gurwitsch recognized, but it is difficult to
say whether he would have agreed with the account offered below. One can hope
he would have at least deemed it worthy of the serious research activity he
called "discussion."
Something more general about Gurwitsch and the
speech problematics may additionally be inserted here because few are aware
that he was long if peripherally interested in linguistics as well as the
psychology, psychopathology, and philosophy of language. Philosophy is often
affected by major scientific advances. Phenomenology's taproot, for example, is
in descriptive psychology. Excesses, however, are always possible, e.g., the
logical and the transcendental psychologisms against which Husserl never ceased
to struggle. The error in general consists in unjustifiably extending
attractive and plausible special-scientific doctrines and methods beyond their
specific regions and in correlatively elevating a special science to the status
of first philosophy (perhaps the deepest assumption that needs questioning in
this regard is that of first philosophy as exclusively cognitive or scientific[4]).
Specifically, the excessive effect (which requires philosophic complicity) of
the scientific investigation of speech may be called on the model of
psychologism "linguisticism."
Aron Gurwitsch had an interest in the
investigation of speech from his student days, when he worked with Gelb and
Goldstein and knew the patient Schneider. According to Holenstein, "he
wrote one of the earliest philosophical responses to the new phonology.”[5]
Later, he reviewed H. J. Pos's "Phénoménologie et linguistique.”[6]
And later still he taught "Philosophy and Psychology of Language" at
the
If one can reflect on speech phenomenologically
without going to extremes, there is a problem with the contemporary interpretation
of Aristotle's definition. On the assumptions that speech is the capacity for
expressing and comprehending significations and that communication among brutes
involves nothing more than the instinctual and learned capacities for
displaying and perceiving signals (and hence no significations), then speech
does differentiate humans from subhuman animals or brutes (whether there are
super-human animals and how humans might differ from them may be ignored here).
Might there be, however, a difference of the human that is more than a
capacity? To be sure, the capacity for speech brings infants under the
definition and the qualification of it as a normal capacity brings mutes and
imbeciles into the human class. Still, even those who can speak do not always
do so and a constantly actual difference for the human would be
preferable. (The abstract attitude and even theoria, not to speak of
reason, are plainly less frequently actualized human potentialities.)
The present essay will investigate the
possibility that speech is not the difference but rather basically
contributes to making the difference of the human. As means to that end,
how phenomenology can render explanatory in addition to strictly descriptive
accounts will first be discussed and then Gurwitsch's theory of
natural-scientific psychological explanation will be transformed into a model
for aitiological explanation in the human sciences at large. At the end it
should appear that speech is but one of many factors for human life and the
problem of whether- it is the central or fundamental factor, as litterati and
public speakers might suppose, etc., will be raised.
In his lectures at the
(5) There are many usages of "to explain,"
some of which occur in sciences of ideal matters, although "to prove"
seems more usual there. Where temporal matters are concerned, some explanations
in the special sciences involve the positing of unobservable "theoretical"
entities, but that will also not be dealt with here. Where one is confined to
observable temporal matters that involve intentive life, i.e., "vital
matters," which is the case in the human sciences fundamentally, then
there are two subspecies of phenomenological explanation, one where the chief
explanans is a purpose and in (he future of the explanandum ("teleological
explanation") and the other where the explanans is a cause in the past of
the explanandum ("aitiological explanation").
(6) Since some consider any account restricted
to observables "descriptive" (by which loose notion the two
subspecies of explanation just denominated are "descriptions"), it
should be stressed that in strict signification, one only describes what
the matter is and does not address the questions of why it is in terms of
purposes or causes, which terms refer to matters other than the matter to be
described.
(7) On the present phenomenological view of
explanation, Husserl's attempt to ground the world in transmundane
intersubjectivity is a third subspecies of explanation, perhaps best called
"grounding explanation." There may be other species of explanation,
but all but two and, in a moment, one will be left out of consideration in this
essay.
Aitiological explanation is possible in the
human sciences. Perhaps "understanding" can also designate a
situation where someone is observed to hear something behind her and turn to
see what it is, the hearing motivating the turning as a cause just as much as
the projected seeing motivates it as a purpose. (That one can in the same way
aitiologically explain in a natural-scientific standpoint does not diminish the
possibility of such explanation in human science as well.) Many phenomenologists
(Scheler, Gurwitsch, Schutz, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, etc.) advocate what may be
called "reflection on others" as a species of observation comparable
to self-observation. In that case, one would be able to observe events in the
other as well as in oneself and thus develop explanations as well as
descriptions. Such a panoply is most plausible for immediate psychological
(including social-psychological) situations, where the directly pursued
purposes and the directly prompting causes of actions and passions can be
observed "in contact," as it were, with the matters that can be explained
with reference to them. If one seeks more distant factors in future and past,
there must be recourse to thought as well as observation.[10]
This holds even more clearly where historical as well as social-scientific
research is concerned.
If this brief attempt at specifying aitiological
or causal explanation in contrast to teleological and other sorts of accounting
for matters in terms of other matters has not only intimated that explanatory
thinking may range well beyond the understood situation but also has its source
in such situations and if urgent epistemological questions about how thought
that reaches beyond what is given can be accepted are set aside, then a
restatement of the thesis of this essay may now be more significant for the
reader: Not all phenomena of human life can be described as including
speech, but they may in part be aitiologically explained in terms of earlier
occurrences of phenomena that do include speech. In anticipation, one may
wonder whether the world of the French is not only a human world because the
French speak but also a French world because the French speak French.
Only obliquely have the human sciences been
addressed thus far. If speech plays a large role in making the difference of
the human, it would be relevant for differentiating the entire family of the
psychological, social, and historical disciplines. After showing a problem
with Gurwitsch's specification of the human sciences that gives the present
inquiry some urgency, the anti-dualistic natural-scientific explanatory-psychological
model that he offers can be adapted for general human science-theoretical
purposes and then a description of speech fitted to it as an explanans.
For Gurwitsch (and seemingly against Husserl and
Schutz, at least as he comprehended their thoughts), the human sciences are
specified by how the matters they address include the functional characters
they originally have in non-scientific life.[11]
Such functional characters can also be called "use characteristics"
in a broad signification whereby end characteristic or purpose is use
characteristic just as much as means character is. One might wish to broaden
this account explicitly to include value characteristic as well and thus speak
in a fully significant way about "cultural objects" rather than
functional objects. Objects, situations, and worlds, including own and other
somatopsychic subjects (brute and human animals), are originally encountered as
having use or serving purposes. By some means, natural scientists learn to
abstract from or neutralize such characters when they are in their disciplinary
attitudes. The human scientist is also qua theoretician neutral with respect to
the purposes and uses to which she might practically put the matters she
investigates, were she in a practical attitude, but those matters involve
humans who live their worlds as fraught with use, purpose, value, etc.
This is an interesting specification of the
human-scientific subject matter and thereby the human sciences until one remembers
that the notion of use object was developed in Wolfgang Köhler's investigations
of chimpanzees during World War I (a decade, incidentally, before Heidegger
discussed the equipmental world of Dasein similarly, which discussion, by the
way, Gurwitsch deeply appreciated[12]).
While it is a great advantage for human-science theory to emphasize how the
human world is a system of originally useful items, more specification is needed
if anthropoid apes are to be excluded from the class of the human. The present
author does not yet have a definite specification to suggest. The present essay
explores the possibility that the differentiating determination of the human,
whatever it may be, is due to speech.
In his magnum opus, The Field of
Consciousness, Aron Gurwitsch offers a model for naturalistic explanation
in psychology.[13]
Like Husserl, although he believed that the human sciences pertained to the
natural attitude and are indeed prior to the natural sciences and include
psychology, he tended to focus on the natural sciences, including
natural-scientific psychology. Both are legitimate sciences of individual as
opposed to collective life, although human-scientific psychology is at once
narrower in focusing on humans to the exclusion of brutes and broader in
including not only psychic life (which the physical and some biological
sciences abstract from) but also the fully cultural character of human selves,
lives, objects, situations, and worlds.[14]
Various dualistic accounts of perception are
specifically examined by Gurwitsch. These have it in common to hold that
perceptual objects have a sensuous infrastratum that is the effect of external
and unobservable factors, such as light waves, and some sort of a superstratum
that is due to internal factors, such as attitude and past experience. The
mind is then like a baker's assistant who receives cupcakes from the oven of
Nature and, in accordance with her training, adds
frosting, perhaps of meaning, to complete them.[15]
The fundamental phenomenological difficulty of such accounts is that perceived
natural objects do not disclose themselves as having two strata, but instead
present themselves as integral and homogeneous. A melody, for example, is not
a sequence of auditory sensa ("notes") that is then organized by the
intellect, for the heard melodic structure is as much an abstractum from the
concrete percept as the notes are, and one is then left to wonder whether
conceptual models expressed in musical notation or the eidetic structures
approximated to and exemplified by particular melodies are not sometimes
mistaken for what they are about or for what approximates or exemplifies them.
Gurwitsch does not object to unobservable
external conditions for perception in the specific perspective of
natural-scientific psychology, although it is clear from other parts of his
science theory that he would consider such to be reified constructs, objects
of scientific faith not really "out there." He also does not abandon
the explanatory model simply because the description of the explanandum must
be corrected. There is simply no need for the number of explanatory factors to
be mirrored in the explanandum. If there were and the internal conditions were
attitude and past experience (nowise a complete list), then the perceptual
object would need to have two superstrata and hence be more like a layer
cake. The unitary percept has a diversity of external and internal conditions.
Thus, if four equidistant objects are perceived at one time as "a
foursome" and at another time as "two pair," the object presents
itself differently due, probably, to changes in the perceiver's attitude, other
internal and external factors remaining constant (and not due to one set of
sensa being interpreted differently).[16]
As mentioned, this model is offered for
natural-scientific psychology. Two moves are needed to relate it to
human science in general. In the first place, matters for the human sciences are
more than merely perceptual since they include uses and values. It may seem
quite plausible to non-phenomenologists that cultural objects are cultural due
to the attitudes and pasts of those who live or encounter them. But this
position can be misconstrued in at least two ways. First, one might identify
the cultural character of cultural objects with the significations that
expressions convey and the correlative affective and conative components in
intentive life with thinking or interpretation. But valuing and striving are
not species of thinking in anything but the unreasonably broad Cartesian
signification of "thinking" and cultural objects as such do not refer
or signify as expressions do by virtue of the significations they convey, something
that is abstracted from in the
formalizing techniques of logic and linguistics (all expressions conversely
are, however, cultural objects). Second, if the cultural object is, unlike the
natural object, something of a cupcake, the superstratum of cultural character
being distinguishable from the homogeneously sensuous infra-stratum, it is one
from which the frosting nevertheless cannot be removed. Every object is a
cultural object, even when the use and value of it has somehow been abstracted
from in a natural-scientific or even a naturalistic-philosophical way.
If the habitual refraining intrinsic to the
natural-scientific psychological attitude is reversed, so that one abstains
from abstaining from the use and value that matters always already have in
human life, then one can engage in human-scientific psychological
investigation. In order now to adapt Gurwitsch's aitiological model, if the
natural-scientifically discernable natural object contained within the cultural
object is considered the external condition or factor (and thus resort
to unobservables is not necessary) and this factor held constant, than
differences between individuals, between stages of personal development, etc.,
are due to internal factors, such as attitude, past experience, and training.
The first step in adapting Gurwitsch's model
thus fits it to human-scientific psychology (on the assumption that
humans can be differentiated from brutes). The second step supplements the
thematization of the individual person with the thematization of communities at
a given time for synchronic social science and with the thematization of
communal change over time for diachronic historical science. It should
be even more plausible that such matters as tradition and common outlook
condition how the human cultural world is collectively encountered. In a
synchronic treatment, where all is treated as if occurring in the same now,
aitiological and teleological explanation undergo certain curious changes.
At this point the contention of this essay may
be even more significant for the reader: because speech is part of communal
human life and is always already there in the past, the world is lived
differently for those with speech than those without it. Even if the difference
thus effected in human life as explanandum cannot be specified (perhaps because
it is merely a matter of degree of subtlety, richness, complexity, etc.), some
things can be said about the proposed explanans. Except for terminological
refinements, the following description of speech is not novel; Aron Gurwitsch
would have accepted it.
There is a species of cultural object called
"expressions." These do have two distinguishable strata in them (the
problems come when one linguistically models natural and cultural objects on
verbal expressions). The infrastratum is perceptible and can vary with the
sensuous mode that predominates, being sometimes predominantly audible,
sometimes predominantly visible, sometime predominantly tangible (some sighted
Braille teachers can, allegedly, read the bumps with their eyes as well as with
their fingers), etc. The superstratum is conceptual and as such intellectually
but not sensuously intuitable. To speak of sense-bestowal
or—better—signification-bestowal (Bedeutungsgebung?) is appropriate with
respect to verbal expressions.
The signification that is carried in the
sensuous vehicle thus indicates the specific intentive processes in which it is
constituted. By virtue of the signification that is expressed in it, an
expression refers to or is about some matter or other, i.e., designates,
denotes, connotes, 'or—in general—signifies a matter. One can call expressions
in a broad signification that covers comprehending and its derivatives
"the spoken" and notice that the spoken has relations not only with
"the spoken about" and "the speaking" but also with
"the spoken to," i.e., the intended "comprehender" (who may
also be "the speaker"). That, however, all requires reflective
observation. In practical life, which is originally unreflective, and so long
as verbal communication is moderately successful, what speaker and comprehender
thematize is either the spoken about or the spoken to. Human scientists,
however, are usually taught also to thematize at least the spoken or the comprehended
as such, i.e. the words, if not also the speaker and the comprehender.
Speaking in the narrow signification is parallel
to writing as species of expressing and hearing is a species of comprehending
parallel to reading. Speaking and hearing are at least psychogenetically and
historically prior to the lexical, i.e., writing and reading, much as the
latter has indeed contributed to the elevation of literate elites during the
past 5,000 years. If it is now true that half of humanity is literate, this is
quite an achievement after several million years. Is there a priority of the
passive over the active mode of verbalization, i.e., of hearing over speaking?
In the explanation proposed here, children can begin to be humanized while
still "infants," i.e., before they engage in verbal expressing. The
sounds of speech may even play a role in this before they are comprehended and
thus are words for them. Concrete investigations of how expression and
especially comprehension, which must precede
it developmentally, emerge in human life, where the infant is surrounded by
speaking others, should be most instructive, especially if compared with the
development of subhuman animals and if one controls for the signaling aspects,
e.g., voice tone, which are present in verbal as well as in non-verbal
communication.
Is humanization due solely to speech? All human
sciences investigate humanization in their overlapping and complementary
specific and subspecific ways. Certainly the world into which humans are born
is already structured by artistic, communicational, economic, educational,
ethnic, gendered, geographical, legal, musical, political, religious, social,
technological, and other factors besides the specifically linguistic. Yet if
speech plays the central role after the brute biological factors in the
nurturing situation and if it is essential to the full impact of other
factors, e.g., if right conduct must be talked about as well as inculcated
through conditioning, then a certain primacy (but still no exclusivity) must
be accorded it. Even Aristotle knew that the human was not only the animal that
has speech but also the animal that lives in community.
The present essay has sought to reorient rather
than settle the issue of what the human is. Drawing on views of Gurwitsch, it
has developed an explanatory model for human-scientific investigation of
non-verbal as well as verbal life and suggested that speech might be the
predominant factor in original humanization. In the way of much philosophical
reflection, however, it has a generally speculative air and thus calls out to
be compared with results of factual research. To what extent, e.g., do
provincial worlds correlate to dialects and to what extent are differences like
that between Germanic Northern Europe and Romantic Southern Europe as well as
differences between Chinese, Greek, Zulu, and other societies, not to speak of
class differences, etc. attributable to differences in language? Factual
variants along such dimensions need to be considered on the way toward eidetic
insight into how the human world in general is what it is due largely to
speech. Whether the present account conducted for science-theoretical and
ultimately for first-philosophical purposes might be of assistance to human
scientists is for the scientists to decide.
Two other questions are even more philosophical.
First, that human life (including human worlds) is always already human
signifies not that the problem of the origin of science is eliminated but
rather that it is more clearly located. Perhaps speech is not only the means
for the communication and preservation of scientific as well as other thought
but specific merits of concrete speech foster
and inhibit the abstract attitude and even theoria.
But, again, it cannot be more than the first
among many factors. Second, if it is correct that expressing and especially comprehending are factors for what humans believe, value, and will, then something of the
mechanism of persuasion has been disclosed and, if
there can be justifiable believing, valuing,
and willing, i.e., reason in the full
signification, then such reason is plainly more than
rational speech and yet the present account discloses something about how speech can function to foster rational
human life.
* Originally published in Essays
in Memory of Aron Gurwitsch, ed. Lester Embree, Copyright 1984,
The Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology, Inc. and co-published by
arrangement with The University Press of America, Inc.,
[1] Aron Gurwitsch, “On Contemporary
Nihilism,” The Review of Politics, Vol. 7 (1945); reprinted in Lester
Embree, ed., Essays in Memory of Aron Gurwitsch, Washington, D.C.:
Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology and University Press of America,
1983, passim.
[2] Aron Gurwitsch, “Quelques aspects et
quelques developements de la psychologie de la forme,” Journal de
Psychologie Normale et Pathologique, Vol. 33 (1936); Translated as “Some
Aspects and Developments of Gestalt Psychology” by Richard Zaner, in Aron
Gurwitsch, Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology, Evanston, IL:
Northwestern University Press, 1966, p. 55.
[3] Aron
Gurwitsch, “Psychologie du langage,” Revue Philosophique de la France et de
l’Étranger, vol. 120 (1935), pp. 99-101, my translation. Cf. also Aron Gurwitsch, “L’Acquisition
du langage d’après H. Delacroix,” Revue de Synthese, vol. 12 (1936).
[4] Cf. Dorion Cairns, “Philosophy as
Striving for sophia in the Integral Sense,” in Essays in Memory of
Aron Gurwitsch, ed. Lester Embree, Washington, D.C.: Center for Advanced
Research in Phenomenology and University Press of America, 1983 and Gerhard
Funke, “The Primacy of Practical Reason in Kant and Husserl,” trans. John
Burkey and Thomas M. Seebohm, in Kant and Phenomenology, ed. Thomas M.
Seebohm and Joseph J. Kockelmans, Washington, D.C.: Center for Advance Research
in Phenomenology and University Press of America, 1983.
[5] Elmar Holenstein, Roman Jakobson’s
Approach to Language, Phenomenological Structuralism, trans. Catherin
Schelbert and Tarcisius Schelbert, Bloomington and London: Indian University
Press, 1974, p. 55. The reference is to the first article cited above in n. 3.
[6] Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, Vol. 2 (1941), pp. 253-257. In this review, Gurwitsch argues with
Pos on the relativity of linguistics to the lifeworld.
[7] “The Phenomenology of Signals and
Significations,” in Aron Gurwitsch, Marginal Consciousness, ed. Lester
Embree,
[8] “Phänomenologie der Thematik und des
reinen Ich,” Psychologische Forschung, Vol. 12 (1929); translated as
“Phenomenology of Thematics and of the Pure Ego: Studies of the Relation between
Gestalt Theory and Phenomenology” by Fred Kersten, in SPP, pp. 253-56.
[9] See Lester Embree, “Merleau-Ponty’s
Examination of Gestalt Psychology,” Research in Phenomenology, Vol. 10
(1980), “Gurwitsch’s Critique of Merleau-Ponty,” The Journal of the British
Society for Phenomenology, Vol. 12 (1981), and the essay cited below in n.
16 for bibliography on the Gurwitsch/ Merleau-Ponty relationship in this and
other respects.
[10] For the possibility of social psychology
done in this mode, see Lester Embree, “Phenomenological Speculations on Lived
Marriageability,” in Philosophy and Archaic Experience, Essays for
Edward G. Ballard, ed. John Sallis, Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press,
1982.
[11] Aron Gurwitsch, Phenomenology and the
Theory of Science, ed. Lester Embree,
[12] Phenomenology and the Theory of
Science, p. 143.
[13] Aron Gurwitsch, The Field of
Consciousness,
[14] Cf. Lester Embree, “The Natural
Scientific Constitutive Phenomenological Psychology of Humans in the Earliest
Sartre,” Research in Phenomenology, Vol. 11 (1981).
[15] Two opinions that may find plausible form
a conundrum if put together: (1) If the dualistic position Gurwitsch opposes is
accepted, then if perceiving is going on, thinking is going on. One
could say that perceiving is “infected” with thinking. (2) It is difficult to
distinguish thinking and speaking. Strictly, there may be an equivalence here,
for if a case of vocalizing or inscribing is speech, thinking is going on in
it, but it is also plausible to contend for the contrary, for when we are
thinking and not speaking aloud we seem always to engage in a fictive “speaking
to ourselves.” This second implication can be taken alone and stated: If
thinking is going on, speaking is going on. Next, if we combine the two
implications, (3) if perceiving is going on, speaking is going on
follows (CKCptCtsCps). Yet while it is plausible that at least waking life
always involves perceiving, it is hardly plausible to suggest that we are
always at least speaking to ourselves; this proposition is false if one can
clearly observe but one moment when one is not engaged in either outward or
inward speech. The present essay is concerned not with how human life might be
(incurably) infected but rather with how it is always affected by speech:
nevertheless, it might be suggested that the above conundrum is best overcome
by rejecting the first implication.
[16] Cf. Lester Embree, “Gestalt Law in
Phenomenological Perspective,” Journal of Phenomenological Psychology,
Vol. 10 (1978). For an explicit connection of Gurwitsch’s objection to the
“‘interpretation-’ or ‘meaning-’ theory,” see Aron Gurwitsch, “Outline of a
Projected Book to be entitled Phenomenology of Perception” in Lester
Embree, ed., Essays in Memory of Gurwitsch, Washington, D.C.: Center for
Advanced Research in Phenomenology and University Press of America, 1983, p.
xvii.